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Abstract
In this paper, we study the design of deep learning-powered
iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). We build on prior
work where preference elicitation was done via kernelized
support vector regressions (SVRs). However, SVR-based ap-
proaches have limitations because the approach requires solv-
ing a machine learning (ML)-based winner determination
problem (WDP). With expressive kernels (like gaussians),
the ML-based WDP cannot be solved for large domains.
While linear or quadratic kernels have better computational
scalability, these kernels have limited expressiveness. In this
work, we address these shortcomings by using deep neural
networks (DNNs) instead of SVRs. We first show how the
DNN-based WDP can be reformulated into a mixed integer
program (MIP). Second, we experimentally compare the pre-
diction performance of DNNs against SVRs in CAs. Finally,
we present experimental evaluations in two auction domains
which show that even small-sized DNNs lead to higher eco-
nomic efficiency than kernelized SVRs.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are used to allocate multiple
to bidders. Specifically, bidders are allowed to submit bids
on bundles of items rather than on single items. CAs are
particularly useful if bidders’ valuations are not linear in the
items but admit substitutional or complementary properties.
CAs are widely used in practice, including for the sale of
spectrum licenses (Cramton 2013) or in industrial procure-
ment (Bichler et al. 2006).
One of the main challenges when conducting large CAs is
that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of
items. This typically makes it impossible for the bidders to
report their full value function, even for medium-sized prob-
lems. Thus, it is still a challenging task to elicit the prefer-
ences of bidders to obtain a highly efficient allocation.
Unfortunately, Nisan and Segal (2006) have shown that
to achieve full efficiency and support general value func-
tions, exponential communication in the number of items is
needed in the worst case. To overcome this issue, many re-
cent proposals have focused on iterative combinatorial auc-
tion (ICA) designs (Parkes 2006).
In ICAs, the goal is typically to find an efficient alloca-
tion without revealing values for all possible 2m bundles,
thus overcoming the curse of dimensionality. The auctioneer
interacts with bidders over multiple rounds until eventually
either an efficient allocation or at least an allocation with a
large social welfare is found.
1.1 Machine Learning and Mechanism Design
Researchers have proposed various ways to further increase
the efficiency of CAs by integrating machine learning (ML)
methods into the mechanism. This research goes back to
Blum et al. (2004) and Lahaie and Parkes (2004), who stud-
ied the relationship between computational learning theory
and preference elicitation in CAs. More recently, Brero and
Lahaie (2018) and Brero, Lahaie, and Seuken (2019) intro-
duced a Bayesian CA where they integrated ML into a CA
to achieve faster convergence. In a different strand of re-
search, Du¨tting et al. (2015; 2017), Narasimhan, Agarwal,
and Parkes (2016) and Golowich, Narasimhan, and Parkes
(2018) used ML to directly learn a new mechanism (follow-
ing the automated mechanism design paradigm).
Most related to the present paper is the work by Brero,
Lubin, and Seuken (2017; 2018a), who proposed a ML-
powered ICA. The core of their auction is a ML-powered
preference elicitation algorithm. As part of this preference
elicitation algorithm, kernelized support vector regressions
(SVRs) are used to learn the nonlinear value functions of
bidders. In an even more recent working paper, Brero, Lu-
bin, and Seuken (2018b) showed that their ML-based ICA
achieves even higher efficiency than the combinatorial clock
auction (CCA), which is the most commonly-used mecha-
nism for spectrum auctions (Ausubel and Baranov 2017).
However, because of runtime complexity issues, Brero,
Lubin, and Seuken (2018b) focused on SVRs with linear and
quadratic kernels. This leaves room for improvement, since
bidders’ valuations can have more complex structures than
can be captured by linear or quadratic kernels.
1.2 Our Approach Using Deep Neural Networks
In this paper, we propose using DNNs instead of SVRs in
ML-powered ICAs. In each round of the auction, we approx-
imate bidders’ value functions by DNNs and subsequently
solve an optimization problem, a DNN-based winner deter-
mination problem (WDP), to determine which query to ask
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every bidder in the next round. Since our design involves do-
ing this in each round of the auction, a central requirement
for the practical implementation of the auction mechanism
is to efficiently solve these DNN-based WDPs. Therefore,
we show how to reformulate the WDP based on DNNs with
rectified linear units (ReLu) as activation functions into a
(linear) mixed integer program (MIP) (Section 4).
Recently, other research have also used studied MIPs in
the context of DNNs. Cheng, Nu¨hrenberg, and Ruess (2017)
studied resilience properties of DNN-based classifiers. Sim-
ilarly, Fischetti and Jo (2018) used a MIP formulation for
finding adversarial examples in image recognition.
To test the performance of our DNN-based approach, we
use the Spectrum Auction Test Suite (SATS) (Weiss, Lu-
bin, and Seuken 2017) to generate synthetic CA instances
(Section 5). We conduct experiments on prediction perfor-
mance, economic efficiency, and MIP runtime in the GSVM
and LSVM domains, and we benchmark our results against
those obtained by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a). Over-
all, our results show that even small-sized-fully-connected-
feed-forward neural networks can achieve a significantly
higher economic efficiency in the entire auction mechanism
than SVRs with quadratic kernels.
2 Preliminaries
We now present our formal model and review the ML-based
ICA introduced by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a).
2.1 Combinatorial Auction Setting
We consider a CA with n bidders and m indivisible items.
Let N := {1, . . . , n} and M := {1, . . . ,m} denote the
set of bidders and items, respectively. We denote by x ∈
X := {0, 1}m a bundle of items represented as an indica-
tor vector, where xj = 1 iff item j ∈ M is contained in
x. Bidders’ true preferences over bundles are represented by
their (private) value functions vi : {0, 1}m → R+, i ∈ N ,
i.e., vi(x) represents bidder i’s true value for bundle x. Let
v := (v1, . . . , vn) denote the vector of bidders’ value func-
tions. The (possibly untruthful) reported valuations are de-
noted by vˆi and vˆ, respectively.
By a := (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Xn we denote an alloca-
tion of bundles to bidders, where ai ∈ X is the bun-
dle bidder i obtains. An allocation a is feasible if each
item is allocated to at most one bidder, i.e., ∀j ∈ M :∑
i∈N aij ≤ 1. We denote the set of feasible allocations
by F := {a ∈ Xn :∑i∈N aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈M}. Payments
are denoted by p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn, where pi is bid-
der i’s payment. Furthermore, we assume that bidders have
quasi-linear utility functions ui(a) := vi(ai)−pi. The (true)
social welfare of an allocation a is defined as V (a) :=∑
i∈N vi(ai). Let a
∗ ∈ arg maxa∈F V (a) be a feasible,
social-welfare maximizing, i.e., efficient, allocation given
the vector of true value functions v. Then the efficiency of
any feasible allocation a ∈ F is measured in terms of a∗ by
V (a)/V (a∗).
An ICA is driven by an auction protocol that asks
bidders to iteratively report their valuations vˆi(·) for
particular bundles selected by the protocol. By ϑˆi :=
{(
x(k), vˆi(x
(k))
)}
k∈Ki⊂N , |Ki| < ∞, x(k) ∈ X we de-
note a finite set of such reported bundle–value pairs of bid-
der i, and ϑˆ := {ϑˆi}i∈N denotes a collection of reported
bundle–value pairs obtained from all bidders. We define the
reported social welfare of an allocation a given ϑˆ by
V̂ (a, ϑˆ) :=
∑
i∈N : (ai,vˆi(ai))∈ϑˆi
vˆi(ai),
where the condition (ai, vˆi(ai)) ∈ ϑˆi ensures that only val-
ues for reported bundles contribute to the sum. Finally, the
optimal feasible allocation a∗
ϑˆ
given ϑˆ is defined as
a∗
ϑˆ
∈ arg max
a∈F
V̂ (a, ϑˆ).
Based on a set of reported values at termination ϑˆ the ICA
mechanism determines a feasible allocation a∗
ϑˆ
∈ F and
charges some payments p, which we define later.
The preference elicitation problem we consider is to find
an (approximately) efficient allocation with a small number
of value queries. Formally:
Problem 1 (PREFERENCE ELICITATION IN ICA). Given a
cap ce on the number of value queries in an ICA, elicit from
each bidder i ∈ N a set of reported bundle–value pairs ϑˆi
with |ϑˆi| ≤ ce such that the resulting efficiency of a∗ϑˆ, i.e.,
V (a∗
ϑˆ
)
V (a∗)
∈ [0, 1],
is maximized.
In practice, a small cap on the number of queries is cho-
sen, e.g., ce ∈ {50, 500}.
2.2 SVR-based ICA
We now present a brief review of the ML-based ICA in-
troduced by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a). At the core
of their auction is an ML-based preference elicitation algo-
rithm which we reprint here as Algorithm 1. This algorithm
is a procedure to determine ϑˆ, i.e., for each bidder i a set
of reported bundle–value pairs ϑˆi. Note that the algorithm
is described in terms of a generic ML algorithm A which is
used in the estimation step (Line 4) to obtain the estimated
social welfare function V˜ t in iteration t. In the optimization
step (Line 5), an ML-based winner determination problem
(WDP) is then solved to find an allocation a(t) that maxi-
mizes V˜ t. Finally, given the allocation a(t) from iteration
t, each bidder i is asked to report his value for the bundles
a
(t)
i . The algorithm stops when it reaches an allocation a
(t)
for which all bidders have already reported their values for
the corresponding bundles a(t)i .
As the ML-algorithm A, Brero, Lubin, and Seuken
(2018a) used a sum of kernelized SVRs, i.e,
A(ϑˆt−1) :=
∑
i∈N
wi · φ.
Algorithm 1: ML-BASED ELICITATION (Brero et al. 2018a)
Parameter : Machine learning algorithm A
1 ϑˆ0 = initial vector of reported bundle–value pairs, t = 0
2 do
3 t← t+ 1
4 Estimation step: V˜ t := A(ϑˆt−1)
5 Optimization step: a(t) ∈ arg max
a∈F
V˜ t(a)
6 for each bidder i do
7 if a(t)i /∈ ϑˆt−1i then
8 Query value vˆi(a
(t)
i )
9 ϑˆti = ϑˆ
t−1
i ∪
{(
a
(t)
i , vˆi(a
(t)
i )
)}
10 else
11 ϑˆti = ϑˆ
t−1
i
12 end
13 end
14 while ∃i ∈ N : a(t)i /∈ ϑˆt−1i
15 Output collection of reported bundle–value pairs ϑˆt
The weights wi are determined through training on the re-
ported bundle–value pairs from earlier rounds of the auc-
tion. Kernelized SVRs are a popular non-linear regression
technique, where a linear model is fitted on transformed
data. The transformation of bundles x ∈ {0, 1}m is im-
plicitly conducted by setting a kernel function k(x, x′) :=
φ(x)Tφ(x′) in the corresponding dual optimization problem
(Smola and Scho¨lkopf 2004).
Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a) called their entire auc-
tion mechanism the Pseudo Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (PVM)
mechanism. We reprint it here as Algorithm 2. PVM calls the
preference elicitation algorithm (Algorithm 1) n + 1 times:
once including all bidders and n times excluding a different
bidder in each run. The motivation for this, which is inspired
by the VCG mechanism, is to obtain payments such that the
auction aligns bidders’ incentives with allocative efficiency.
For each of the reported bundle–value pairs ϑˆ(−i) obtained
from these n + 1 runs, an allocation that maximizes the re-
ported social welfare is calculated (Line 2).1 The final al-
location apvm is determined as the allocation of the n + 1
runs which has the largest reported social welfare (Line 3).
Finally, VCG-style payments are calculated (Line 4).
Algorithm 2: PVM (Brero et al. 2018a)
1 Run Algorithm 1 n+1 times to get ϑˆ(−∅), ϑˆ(−1), ..., ϑˆ(−n).
2 Determine allocations: a(−∅), a(−1), . . . , a(−n), where
a(−i) ∈ arg maxa∈F V̂ (a, ϑˆ(−i)).
3 Pick apvm ∈ {a(−∅), a(−1), ..., a(−n)} with maximal V̂ .
4 Charge each bidder i according to:
ppvmi :=
∑
j 6=i
vˆj
(
a
(−i)
j
)
−
∑
j 6=i
vˆj
(
apvmj
)
.
1ϑˆ(−i) denotes the output of Algorithm 1 by excluding bidder i
from the set of bidders.
3 Deep Neural Network-based ICA
In this section, we present the high level design of our DNN-
based ICA and discuss its advantages compared to the SVR-
based design by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a).
Observe that the choice of the ML algorithmA affects Al-
gorithm 1 in two ways: first, in the estimation step, A deter-
mines how well we can predict bidders’ valuations; second,
in the optimization step, it determines the complexity of the
ML-based WDP. Thus, our situation is different from stan-
dard supervised learning because of the added optimization
step. In particular, when choosing A, we must also ensure
that we obtain a practically feasible ML-based WDP.
To address this, Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a) used
SVRs with quadratic kernels, for which the ML-based WDP
is a quadratic integer program (QIP) and still practically fea-
sible for large settings. Note that a quadratic kernel, while
more expressive than a linear kernel, can still at most model
two-way interactions between the items. Brero, Lubin, and
Seuken (2018a) also tried more expressive kernels (gaus-
sian and exponential), but for these kernels the resulting
ML-based WDP cannot be solved for larger settings. How-
ever, using SVRs with quadratic kernels leaves room for im-
provement, since bidders’ valuations can have more com-
plex structures than can be captured by quadratic kernels.
In this work, we show how these shortcomings can be
addressed by using DNNs instead of SVRs in the estima-
tion and optimization steps of Algorithm 1. DNNs are a
concatenation of affine and non-linear mappings (see Fig-
ure 1). They consist of several layers, which are themselves
composed of multiple nodes. Between each of the layers an
affine transformation is applied, which is followed by a non-
linear mapping called the activation function.
One advantage of DNNs compared to SVRs with non-
linear kernels is that, for any number of hidden layers and
nodes, we can always obtain a (linear) MIP for the DNN-
based WDP (as we will show in Section 4). In contrast to
the SVR-based approach (Brero, Lubin, and Seuken 2017),
the size of our MIPs only grows linearly in the number of
items and bidders. The key insight for this is to use rectified
linear units (ReLus) as activation functions. Furthermore, in
contrast to SVRs, DNNs do not use predefined feature trans-
formations. While with SVRs, the choice of a good kernel
usually relies on prior domain knowledge, DNNs automati-
cally learn features in the process of training.
Towards formalizing our DNN-based approach, we de-
compose the estimated social welfare function in Line 4 of
Algorithm 1 V˜ t = A(ϑˆt−1) as follows:
V˜ t =
∑
i∈N
v˜ti ,
where v˜ti is an estimate of bidder i’s true value function vi
and is trained on the data set ϑˆt−1i , i.e., the values queried
up to round t − 1. For every i ∈ N , we model v˜ti using
a fully-connected-feed-forward DNN Ni : {0, 1}m → R+.
Consequently, the estimated social welfare function V˜ t is
given as a sum of fully-connected-feed-forward DNNs
V˜ t :=
∑
i∈N
Ni.
4 MIP Formulation of the DNN-based
Winner Determination Problem
In this section, we present the parameterization of each DNN
Ni and we show how to reformulate the DNN-based WDP
into a MIP. Thus, we focus on Line 5 of Algorithm 1.
4.1 Setting up the DNN-based WDP
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a DNN Ni.
We now define the parameters of the DNNs. To simplify the
exposition, we consider a fixed iteration step t and no longer
highlight the dependency of all variables on t.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of a DNN
Each DNNNi consists ofK−1 hidden layers forK ∈ N,
with each layer containing dk hidden nodes, where k ∈
{1, . . . ,K − 1}. As Ni maps bundles x ∈ {0, 1}m to val-
ues, the dimension of the input layer d0 is equal to the num-
ber of items m (i.e., d0 := m) and the dimension of the
output layer is equal to 1 (i.e., dK := 1). Hence, in total,
a single DNN consists of K + 1 layers. Furthermore, let
ϕ : R → R+, ϕ(s) := max(0, s) denote the ReLu activa-
tion function.2 The affine mappings between the kth and the
k+1st layer are parameterized by a matrix W i,k ∈ Rdk+1×dk
and a bias bi,k ∈ Rdk+1 , k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}.
To estimate the parameters W i,k and bi,k from data (i.e.,
from the bundle–value pairs ϑˆi) we use the ADAM algo-
rithm, which is a popular gradient-based optimization tech-
nique (Kingma and Ba 2015). This is done in the estimation
step in Line 4 of Algorithm 1. Thus, after the estimation
step, W i,k and bi,k are constants. In summary, given esti-
mated parameters W i := {W i,k}0≤k≤K−1 and bi :=
{bi,k}0≤k≤K−1, each DNN Ni(W i, bi) : {0, 1}m → R+
represents the following nested function:
Ni(W i, bi)(x) = (1)
= ϕ
(
W i,K−1ϕ
(
. . . ϕ(W i,0x+ bi,0) . . .
)
+ bi,K−1
)
.
The DNN-based WDP in the optimization step in Line 5 of
2These act on vectors componentwise, i.e., for s ∈ Rk let
ϕ(s) := (ϕ(s1), . . . , ϕ(sk)).
Algorithm 1 can now be formulated as follows:
max
a∈Xn
{∑
i∈N
Ni
(
W i, bi
)
(ai)
}
s.t.
∑
i∈N
aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈M (OP1)
aij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈M, ∀i ∈ N.
4.2 The MIP Formulation
In its general form, (OP1) is a nonlinear, non-convex op-
timization problem. For such problems, there do not exist
practically feasible algorithms that are guaranteed to find
a globally optimal solution. Therefore, we now reformulate
(OP1) into a MIP.
Consider an arbitrary bidder i ∈ N . For every layer k ∈
{1, . . . ,K} let oi,k ∈ Rdk+ denote the output of the kth layer,
which can be recursively calculated as
oi,k = ϕ(W i,k−1oi,k−1 + bi,k−1) =
= max(0,W i,k−1oi,k−1 + bi,k−1). (2)
For k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we introduce dk binary decision
variables that determine which node in the corresponding
layer is active, represented as a vector yi,k ∈ {0, 1}dk . We
also introduce 2dk continuous variables, represented as vec-
tors zi,k, si,k ∈ Rdk . Each zi,k corresponds to the posi-
tive components of the output value oi,k of each layer and
each si,k is used as a slack variable representing the abso-
lute value of the negative components of oi,k.
In our final MIP formulation, we will make use of “big-
M” constraints. For our theoretical results to hold, we need
to make the following standard assumption.
Assumption 1 (BIG-M CONSTRAINT). For all i ∈ N and
k ∈ {1, ...,K} there exists a large enough constantL ∈ R+,
such that
∣∣(W i,k−1oi,k−1 + bi,k−1)j∣∣ ≤ L, 1 ≤ j ≤ dk.
In the following lemma, we show how to recursively en-
code a layer of Ni given the output value of the previous
layer as multiple linear constraints.3
Lemma 1. Let W i,k−1oi,k−1 + bi,k−1 ∈ Rdk be fixed for a
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Furthermore, let zi,k, si,k ∈ Rdk , yi,k ∈
{0, 1}dk . Consider the following linear constraints:
zi,k − si,k =W i,k−1oi,k−1 + bi,k−1 (3)
0 ≤ zi,k ≤ yi,k · L (4)
0 ≤ si,k ≤ (1− yi,k) · L. (5)
Then the polytope defined by Equations (3)-(5) is not empty
and every element
(
(zi,k)∗, (si,k)∗, (yi,k)∗
)
of this polytope
satisfies (zi,k)∗ = oi,k.
Proof. For notational convenience let c :=W i,k−1oi,k−1 +
bi,k−1. Non-emptiness follows since |cj | ≤ L, 1 ≤ j ≤ dk
by assumption. From Constraints (4) and (5) it follows, for
1 ≤ j ≤ dk, that if (zi,k)j > 0 then (si,k)j = 0, and if
3In the following, all constraints containing vectors are defined
componentwise.
(si,k)j > 0 then (zi,k)j = 0. We now have to distinguish
the following three cases for each component of c:
cj < 0 =⇒ (yi,k)∗j = 0, (si,k)∗j = −cj , (zi,k)∗j = 0 = ϕ(cj)
cj > 0 =⇒ (yi,k)∗j = 1, (si,k)∗j = 0, (zi,k)∗j = cj = ϕ(cj)
cj = 0 =⇒
(
(zi,k)∗j , (s
i,k)∗j , (y
i,k)∗j
)
∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
Combining all cases yields that (zi,k)∗ = ϕ(cj) = oi,k.
We can now formulate the DNN-based WDP as a MIP.
Let W i, bi denote the estimated parameters corresponding
to Ni(W i, bi). Furthermore, let a ∈ Xn, yi,k ∈ {0, 1}dk
and zi,k, si,k ∈ Rdk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K and L be a constant
satisfying Assumption 1.
max
a∈Xn,zi,k,si,k,yi,k
{∑
i∈N
zi,K
}
s.t. (OP2)
zi,0 = ai
zi,k − si,k =W i,k−1zi,k−1 + bi,k−1
0 ≤ zi,k ≤ yi,k · L
0 ≤ si,k ≤ (1− yi,k) · L
yi,k ∈ {0, 1}dk

i = 1, . . . , N
k = 1, . . . ,K
aij ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , d0, i ∈ N∑
i∈N
aij ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , d0.
We are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. (MIP FORMULATION) The DNN-based WDP
as defined in (OP1) is equivalent to the MIP defined in (OP2).
Proof. Consider the (OP1). For each bidder i ∈ N , we first
set zi,0 equal to the input bundle ai. Then we proceed by
using Lemma 1 for k = 1, i.e., we reformulate the output
of the 1st layer as the linear constraints (3), (4) and (5). We
iterate this procedure until we have reformulated the final
layer, i.e, k = K. Doing so for each bidder i ∈ N and
adding the feasibility constraints yields (OP2).
Using this MIP formulation we can solve the DNN-based
WDP using standard optimization packages like CPLEX. We
provide a simple worked example for how to reformulate
(OP1) into (OP2) in Appendix A.
Remark 1. The number of decision variables in the MIP
defined in (OP2) is given by
n︸︷︷︸
#bidders
·
 m︸︷︷︸
#items
+ 3︸︷︷︸
yi,k, si,k,zi,k
·

#hidden layers︷ ︸︸ ︷
K − 1∑
k=1
dk︸︷︷︸
#hidden nodes
+
output︷︸︸︷
1


5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our deep
learning-powered ICA and compare it against the SVR-
based approach by Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2018a).
5.1 Experiment setup
Spectrum auctions are one of the most prominent applica-
tions of CAs, which is why we choose them as a test case for
our experiments. Specifically, we use the spectrum auction
test suite (SATS) version 0.6.4 (Weiss, Lubin, and Seuken
2017). SATS enables us to generate 1000s of different CA
instances in different domains. Furthermore, we have access
to each bidder’s true value vi(x) for all 2m possible bundles
as well as the efficient allocation a∗ ∈ F , which we can use
to measure the efficiency of any other allocation a by V (a)V (a∗) .
We test our approach using two auction domains:
1. The Global Synergy Value Model (GSVM) (Goeree and
Holt 2010) consists of 6 regional bidders, 1 national bid-
der, and 18 items. In GSVM, global complementarities
apply, i.e., the value of a package increases by a certain
percentage with every additional item of interest. Thus,
the value of a bundle only depends on the total number
of items contained in a bundle which makes it one of the
easiest models in SATS. In fact, in GSVM, bidders’ val-
uations can be exactly learned by SVRs with quadratic
kernels (see Brero, Lubin, and Seuken (2019)).
2. The Local Synergy Value Model (LSVM) (Scheffel,
Ziegler, and Bichler 2012) consists of 5 regional bidders,
1 national bidder and 18 items. The items are arranged on
a rectangle of size 3× 6. The national bidder is interested
in all items, while the regional bidders are only interested
in certain subsets of items. Complementarities arise from
spatial proximity of items and are modeled via a logistic
function, which makes it more complex than GSVM.
5.2 Prediction Performance
We first compare the prediction performance of DNNs to
SVRs. Using SATS, we generate a data set of bundle–value
pairs {(x(k), vi(x(k)))} for all bidders i ∈ N . For each auc-
tion domain, we draw 100 auction instances uniformly at
random. For each such instance, we sample, for each bidder
type, a training set T of equal size and a disjoint test set V
consisting of all remaining bundles, i.e., |V | := 2m − |T |.
For each bidder type, we train the ML algorithm on T and
test it on V . We report the mean absolute error (MAE) for
both bidder types averaged over the 100 instances.4
We denote by [d1, d2, d3] a 3-hidden-layer DNN with d1,
d2 and d3 hidden nodes, respectively. For both, SVRs and
DNNs, we performed a hyperparameter optimization.5
In Table 1, we present the results for the GSVM do-
main. We first observe the very good prediction perfor-
mance of the SVRs and in particular that the test error con-
verges to 0 when increasing |T |. This is due to the fact that
in GSVM, bidders’ value functions can be perfectly cap-
tured by quadratic kernels. In this sense, GSVM represents a
“worst case” auction domain w.r.t our comparison of DNNs
against quadratically-kernelized SVRs. Looking at the per-
formance of our DNN-based approach, we observe that the
4For training the DNNs, we use the MAE as the loss function.
5The following architectures were considered for the DNNs:
[10], [100], [1000], [10,10], . . ., [1000,1000,1000]. For details on
the hyperparameter optimization see Appendix B.
Bidder DNN
Model |T | Type Architecture MAEtrain MAEtest
50 National [1000] 1.37 5.13 (0.11)Regional [1000] 1.40 5.91 (0.19)
DNNs 100 National [1000] 1.40 3.04 (0.07)Regional [1000] 1.60 4.00 (0.13)
200 National [1000] 1.19 1.73 (0.05)Regional [1000] 1.53 2.38 (0.09)
kernel k(x, y)
50 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 4.38 (0.11)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 4.98 (0.20)
SVRs 100 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 1.71 (0.04)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 2.07 (0.07)
200 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 0.12 (0.00)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 0.03 0.13 (0.00)
Table 1: Prediction performance in GSVM. All results are
averaged over 100 auction instances. For MAEtest, standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
test error also decreases with |T |, but, not surprisingly, is
always larger than for the SVR-based approach.
In Table 2, we present the results for the more complex
LSVM domain. We observe that for |T | = 50, the DNN-
based and the SVR-based approaches have similar test er-
ror. But for |T | = 100 and |T | = 200, our DNN-based ap-
proach significantly outperforms the SVR-based approach.
We provide additional results comparing our DNN-based
approach against other kernels (exponential, gaussian, and
higher-degree polynomials) in Appendix B.
5.3 Efficiency Results
Finally, we compare the economic efficiency of our DNN-
powered ICA against the SVR-powered ICA. When con-
ducting the efficiency experiments, We follow Brero, Lu-
bin, and Seuken (2018a) and assume that bidders answer
all value queries truthfully. Furthermore, we also keep their
Bidder DNN
Model |T | Type Architecture MAEtrain MAEtest
50 National [10] 24.68 29.90 (0.23)Regional [1000] 1.90 16.46 (0.39)
DNNs 100 National [10, 10, 10] 9.01 25.62 (0.36)Regional [1000] 2.52 13.39 (0.26)
200 National [10, 10] 10.52 20.58 (0.21)Regional [1000, 1000] 2.87 10.79 (0.23)
kernel k(x, y)
50 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 18.51 32.61 (0.59)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 3.11 15.30 (0.34)
SVRs 100 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 20.03 27.86 (0.28)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 3.21 14.21 (0.28)
200 National x
T y + γ(xT y)2 20.03 25.44 (0.16)
Regional xT y + γ(xT y)2 8.23 12.67 (0.26)
Table 2: Prediction performance in LSVM. All results are
averaged over 100 auction instances.
Max % % t-test on
Model #Queries #Queries Efficiency Revenue6 #Deficits7 Efficiency8
DNNs 53 78 98.63 (0.18) 67.81 0 0.337
SVRs 41.9 42.8 98.85 (0.13) 77.80 0
Table 3: A comparison of the DNN-based ICA against the
SVR-based ICA (as reported in Brero, Lubin, and Seuken
(2018a)) on a test set of 100 GSVM auction instances. All
results are averaged over the 100 instances. For efficiency,
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
experimental setup and define a cap ce on the number of
queries in Algorithm 1 and set ce := 50. The initial set of
reported bundle–value pairs ϑˆ0i per bidder i is drawn uni-
formly at random and set to be equal across bidders. The
number of initial reports is denoted by c0 := |ϑˆ0i |, ∀i ∈ N ,
resulting in a maximum of c0 + n · (ce − c0) queries.
In Table 3, we show the efficiency results comparing our
DNN-based ICA against the SVR-based ICA for GSVM.
The architecture of the DNN is [32,32] for the regional bid-
ders, [10,10] for the national bidder, and we used c0 = 30.
This was the winning model chosen from a set of 8 DNN ar-
chitectures evaluated on a training set of 100 GSVM auction
instances (see Appendix C for details on the training results).
Even though this domain can be perfectly captured by SVRs
with quadratic kernels, our DNN-based approach achieves a
similar result w.r.t to efficiency, where the difference is not
statistically significant (p = 0.337).8
We now turn our attention to the more complex LSVM
domain. In Table 4, we first show the results from compar-
ing eight different DNN architectures on a training set of
100 auction instances. As we can see, the winning model is
among the largest DNN architectures.
% %
DNN Architectures9 c0 Efficiency Revenue #Deficits
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10] 40 97.40 60.51 0
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10] 30 96.87 56.85 0
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10, 10] 40 97.45 61.15 0
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10, 10] 30 97.12 59.31 0
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10] 40 97.40 62.01 0
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10] 30 96.83 59.07 0
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10]* 40 97.74 61.95 0
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10] 30 97.12 59.56 0
Table 4: Efficiency results for 8 configurations of a DNN-
based ICA on a training set of 100 LSVM auction instances.
The selected winner model is marked with a *. All results
are averaged over the 100 auction instances.
6Revenue is calculated according to (
∑
i∈N p
pvm
i )/V (a
∗).
7The #Deficits column denotes the number of auction instances
where the revenue was negative. While conducting our experi-
ments, we observed one auction instance with a deficit.
8We performed a two-sided unpaired Welch Two Sample t-test
for efficiency withH0 : µ1 = µ2 againstHA : µ1 6= µ2.
9We denote by R and N the architectures used for the regional-
and national bidders, respectively.
Max % % % t-test on
Model #Queries #Queries Efficiency Revenue #Deficits Efficiency8
* DNNs 65 77 97.74 (0.24) 62.45 0 0.000038
SVRs 48.2 52.8 96.03 (0.33) 65.60 0
Table 5: A comparison of the DNN-based ICA against the
SVR-based ICA (as reported in Brero, Lubin, and Seuken
(2018a)) on a test set of 100 LSVM auction instances. All
results are averaged over the 100 instances. For efficiency,
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
In Table 5, we compare the performance of the selected
winner model from Table 4 against the SVR-based approach
on a test set of 100 auction instances. Here we see that our
DNN-based ICA significantly outperforms the SVR-based
ICA by 1.74 percentage points, and this effect is highly sta-
tistically significant (p = 0.000038). This demonstrates the
advantage of DNNs over SVRs with quadratic kernels in
complex domains like LSVM.
In Figure 2, we present a histogram of the efficiency ob-
tained by the selected winner model on the test set.10 We
see that for 29 auction instances, our approach (impres-
sively) obtains an economic efficiency of 100%. However,
for two instances, the efficiency is less than 90%. Thus, it
is a promising avenue for future work to investigate these
outliers to further increase the average efficiency.
mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
97.74 2.35 86.51 96.67 98.33 99.48 100.0
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 1000
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Figure 2: Histogram of efficiency results (in %) in LSVM of
the selected DNN winner model on the test set.
5.4 MIP Runtime Analysis
Recall that the choice of the ML algorithm affects the pre-
diction performance and the complexity of the ML-based
WDP, and thus the overall runtime of the auction. Given that
we have formulated the DNN-based WDP as a MIP, the key
measurement of interest is now the average runtime of a sin-
gle MIP, because we have to solve hundreds of MIPs over the
course of running a single auction. In Figure 3, we present
runtime results for the four DNN architectures presented ear-
lier in LSVM (see Appendix D for results in GSVM).11 We
10The average runtime of the winner model for a single auction
instance in LSVM was 94 min.
11Experiments were conducted on machines with Intel Xeon E5-
2650 v4 2.20GHz processors with 40 logical cores.
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Figure 3: Empirical distribution of the solution times of the
MIPs defined in (OP2) based on 50 different LSVM in-
stances (≈ 13000 MIPs in total). Results are shown for a
selection of various DNN architectures.
observe two effects: First, increasing the number of nodes
per layer slightly increases the average runtime. Second,
adding an additional layer (for the national bidder) signif-
icantly increases the average runtime. Not surprisingly, the
largest DNN architectures lead to the highest runtime.
The runtime of our MIPs heavily depends on the size
of the “big-M” variable L. In practice, L should be cho-
sen as small as possible to obtain a MIP formulation that
is as tight as possible (we set L := 5000). Tjeng, Xiao, and
Tedrake (2019) proposed a novel bound tightening algorithm
where an additional optimization problem has to be solved
in advance to determine tighter big-M constraints. However,
since we must solve hundreds of different MIPs for a single
auction instance, it is not clear how much of a speedup this
approach would yield in our setting. Evaluating this in more
detail is subject to future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have designed a deep learning-powered it-
erative combinatorial auction. We have compared our ap-
proach against prior work using SVRs with quadratic ker-
nels. Our experimental results have shown that our DNN-
based approach leads to significantly higher economic effi-
ciency in complex auction domains. Note that in large spec-
trum auctions, increasing the efficiency by 1-2% can imply a
welfare increase on the order of 100s of millions of dollars.
On a technical level, our main contribution was to refor-
mulate the DNN-based WDP into a MIP. The main insight
to achieve this was to use ReLu activation functions, which
can be re-written as multiple linear constraints. From an ex-
perimental point of view, we were pleasantly surprised to
see that even DNNs with a small number of layers and nodes
and with a small number of training samples (i.e., bids) were
able to achieve high prediction performance and ultimately
high economic efficiency in the overall auction mechanism.
Future work should investigate the trade-off between
larger DNN architectures and the resulting MIP runtime,
to further increase efficiency. Moreover, more experiments
are needed. We are currently already comparing the perfor-
mance of our DNN-based approach against the SVR-based
approach in a larger domain with 10 bidders and 98 items.
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Appendix
A Example for Reformulating a DNN-based
WDP into a MIP
We provide a simple worked example for how to reformulate
(OP1) into (OP2) by considering only one agent (n = 1), m
items (d0 = m) and one hidden layer (K = 2).
Example 1. Given W 1,0 ∈ Rd1×m, W 1,1 ∈ R1×d1 ,b1,0 ∈
Rd1 , and b1,1 ∈ R, (OP1) can be written as
max
a1∈X 1
{
max
(
0,W 1,1max
(
0,W 1,0a1 + b
1,0
)
+ b1,1
)}
s.t. a1j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈M,
where the constraint
∑
i∈N aij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ M is redundant
in this case, since we only consider one agent. In a first step,
we replace the inner maximum by using y1,1 ∈ {0, 1}d1 and
z1,1, s1,1 ∈ Rd1 and arrive at the equivalent optimization
problem
max
a1∈X 1
z1,1, s1,1, y1,1
{
max
(
0,W 1,1z1,1 + b1,1
)}
s.t. z1,1 − s1,1 =W 1,0a1 + b1,0
0 ≤ z1,1 ≤ y1,1 · L
0 ≤ s1,1 ≤ (1− y1,1) · L
a1j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈M.
Applying Lemma 1 again to the new objective function and
using variables y1,2 ∈ {0, 1} and z1,2, s1,2 ∈ R yields the
final MIP formulation
max
a1∈X 1, z1,k
y1,k, s1,k, k∈{1,2}
{
z1,2
}
s.t. z1,1 − s1,1 =W 1,0a1 + b1,0
0 ≤ z1,1 ≤ y1,1 · L
0 ≤ s1,1 ≤ (1− y1,1) · L
z1,2 − s1,2 =W 1,1z1,1 + b1,1
0 ≤ z1,2 ≤ y1,2 · L
0 ≤ s1,2 ≤ (1− y1,2) · L
a1j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈M.
B Additional Prediction Performance Results
In this section, we present detailed prediction performance
results in GSVM and LSVM for various kernelized SVRs.
GSVM Recall, we sampled 100 instances of GSVM with
default configuration, i.e, 6 regional bidders and 1 national
bidder.
In Table 6 and 7, prediction performance results of the
best performing DNNs and kernelized SVRs are presented.
The models were trained on a uniformly at random selected
training set T of size 50, 100 and 200 and validated on all
remaining bundles in LSVM, i.e., the size of the validation
set V was set according to 218−50, 218−100 and 218−200,
respectively.
Additional parameters of these models like λ (L2-
regularization for DNNs), η (learning rate for ADAM for
bidder DNN
model |T | type architectures MAEtrain MAEtest
DNNs 50 National [1000] 1.37 (0.06) 5.13 (0.11)Regional [1000] 1.40 (0.07) 5.91 (0.19)
DNNs 100 National [1000] 1.40 (0.06) 3.04 (0.07)Regional [1000] 1.60 ( 0.08) 4.00 (0.13)
DNNs 200 National [1000] 1.19(0.05) 1.73 (0.05)Regional [1000] 1.53(0.08) 2.38 (0.09)
Table 6: Detailed DNN prediction performance in GSVM.
All results are averaged over 100 auction instances. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
Bidder Degree
Model Kernel |T | Type q r MAEtrain MAEtest
50 National - - 9.94 (0.22) 17.50 (0.33)Regional - - 9.49 (0.30) 16.12 (0.53)
SVRs xT y 100 National - - 11.89 (0.23) 15.20 (0.29)Regional - - 10.87 (0.36) 13.70 (0.43)
200 National - - 12.50 (0.23) 14.22 (0.25)Regional - - 11.79 (0.38) 13.18 (0.42)
50 National - - 0.03 (0.00) 5.07 (0.12)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 5.75 (0.23)
SVRs e(x
T y)·γ 100 National - - 0.03 (0.00) 2.35 (0.04)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 2.68 (0.09)
200 National - - 0.04 (0.00) 1.11 (0.02)Regional - - 0.04 (0.00) 1.29 (0.04)
50 National 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 4.38 (0.11)Regional 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 4.98 (0.20)
SVRs xT y + γ(xT y)q 100 National 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 1.71 (0.04)Regional 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 2.07 (0.07)
200 National 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00)Regional 2 - 0.03 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)
50 National 2 1 0.36 (0.01) 4.59 (0.10)Regional 2 1 0.03 (0.00) 5.29 ( 0.20)
SVRs (γ · xT y + r)q 100 National 4 1 0.03 (0.00) 2.02 (0.04)Regional 4 1 0.03 (0.00) 2.40 (0.08)
200 National 2 1 0.03 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)Regional 2 1 0.03 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)
50 National - - 0.42 (0.02) 9.02 (0.22)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 9.57 (0.37)
SVRs e−(‖x−y‖
2
2·γ) 100 National - - 0.03 (0.00) 4.21 (0.09)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 4.85 (0.17)
200 National - - 0.03 (0.00) 1.71 (0.03)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 2.12 (0.08)
Table 7: Detailed SVR prediction performance in GSVM.
All results are averaged over 100 auction instances. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
DNNs), dropout probability for DNNs as well as C (regu-
larization parameter in SVRs),  (-sensitive loss in SVRs),
γ (kernel parameter in SVRS) are not shown here but were
also part of the hyper-parameter optimization.
LSVM Recall, we sampled 100 instances of LSVM with
default configuration, i.e, 5 regional bidders and 1 national
bidder. In Table 8 and 9, prediction performance results of
the best performing DNNs and kernelized SVRs are pre-
sented. Training and validation was performed analogously
as in GSVM.
C Additional Efficiency Results in GSVM
In this section, we present detailed efficiency results in
GSVM (Tables 10 and 11). For training we selected 100
auction instances with seeds {1, . . . , 100} and tested the se-
lected winner model on 100 auction instances with seeds
{101, . . . , 200}. In Figure 4, we present a histogram of the
efficiency distribution obtained by the the selected winner
model on the test set.
Bidder DNN
Model |T | Type Architecture MAEtrain MAEtest
50 National [10] 24.68 (0.60) 29.90 (0.23)Regional [1000] 1.90 (0.08) 16.46 (0.39)
DNNs 100 National [10, 10, 10] 9.01 (0.34) 25.62 (0.36)Regional [1000] 2.52 (0.11) 13.39 (0.26)
200 National [10, 10] 10.52 (0.25) 20.58 (0.21)Regional [1000, 1000] 2.87 (0.13) 10.79 (0.23)
Table 8: Detailed DNN prediction performance in LSVM.
All results are averaged over 100 auction instances. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
Bidder Degree
Model Kernel |T | Type q r MAEtrain MAEtest
50 National - - 24.94 (0.60) 34.35 (0.71)Regional - - 13.31 ( 0.29) 24.30 (0.58)
SVRs xT y 100 National - - 26.93 (0.52) 29.29 (0.25)Regional - - 16.63 (0.35) 21.86 (0.46)
200 National - - 26.83 (0.44) 28.00 (0.18)Regional - - 17.50 (0.39) 20.01 (0.43)
50 National - - 25.03 (0.63) 28.11 (0.19)Regional - - 3.15 (0.04) 15.66 (0.36)
SVRs e(x
T y)·γ 100 National - - 25.56 (0.48) 27.17 (0.18)Regional - - 3.24 (0.03) 13.72 (0.26)
200 National - - 21.70 (0.34) 25.57 (0.17)Regional - - 3.50 (0.04) 11.81 (0.24)
50 National 2 - 18.51 (0.44) 32.61 (0.59)Regional 2 - 3.11 (0.04) 15.30 (0.34)
SVRs xT y + γ(xT y)q 100 National 2 - 20.03 (0.36) 27.86 (0.28)Regional 2 - 3.21 (0.03) 14.21 (0.28)
200 National 2 - 20.03 ( 0.30) 25.44 (0.16)Regional 2 - 8.23 (0.19) 12.67 (0.26)
50 National 6 0 1.35 (0.04) 22.30 (0.18)Regional 2 0 3.11 (0.04) 15.45 (0.35)
SVRs (γ · xT y + r)q 100 National 6 0 0.83 (0.02) 20.18 (0.13)Regional 4 1 3.20 (0.03) 13.65 (0.26)
200 National 6 0 0.57 ( 0.01) 19.15 (0.12)Regional 2 0 5.88 (0.13) 11.65 (0.24)
50 National - - 11.15 (0.29) 30.50 (0.27)Regional - - 0.03 (0.00) 17.33 (0.40)
SVRs e−(‖x−y‖
2
2·γ) 100 National - - 11.94 (0.21) 28.13 (0.23)Regional - - 3.98 (0.07) 14.19 (0.26)
200 National - - 13.07 (0.20) 26.28 ( 0.18)Regional - - 0.39 (0.00) 11.71 (0.22)
Table 9: Detailed SVR prediction performance in LSVM.
All results are averaged over 100 auction instances. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
D MIP runtime results in GSVM
Lastly, we present an analysis of the average runtime of the
MIP defined in (OP2) in GSVM. Again we globally set L :=
5000.
12We denote by R and N the architecture used for the regional-
and national bidders, respectively.
13We performed a two sided unpaired Welch Two Sample t-test
withH0 : µ1 = µ2 againstHA : µ1 6= µ2.
% %
DNN Architectures12 c0 Efficiency Revenue #Deficits
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10] 40 98.53% 69.26% 0%
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10] 30 98.41% 68.29% 0%
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10, 10] 40 98.51% 68.91% 0%
R:[16, 16] | N:[10, 10, 10] 30 98.32% 68.59% 0%
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10] 40 98.75% 71.14% 0%
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10]* 30 98.94% 68.47% 0%
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10] 40 98.69% 71.63% 0%
R:[32, 32] | N:[10, 10, 10] 30 98.92% 68.88% 0%
Table 10: Efficiency results for 8 configurations of a DNN-
based ICA on a training set of 100 LSVM auction instances.
The selected winner model is marked with a *. All results
are averaged over the 100 auction instances.
Max % % t-test on
Model #Queries #Queries Efficiency Revenue #Deficits Efficiency13
DNNs 53 78 98.63 (0.18) 67.81 0 0.337
SVRs 41.9 42.8 98.85 (0.13) 77.80 0
Table 11: A comparison of the DNN-based ICA against the
SVR-based ICA (as reported in Brero, Lubin, and Seuken
(2018a)) on a test set of 100 GSVM auction instances. All
results are averaged over the 100 instances. For efficiency,
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
98.63 1.85 93.61 97.68 99.57 100.0 100.0
94 95 96 97 98 99 1000
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Figure 4: Histogram of efficiency results in % on the test set.
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Figure 5: Empirical distribution of the solution times of the
MIPs defined in (OP2) based on 50 different LSVM in-
stances (≈ 13000 MIPs in total). Results are shown for a
selection of various DNN architectures.
